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Chapter 1 
BACK TO PARTIES? 
PARTISAN LOGICS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF POLITICS IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 
M. Catusse and K. Karam* 
 
From the outset, the project to edit a book on political parties in the Arab world has faced a dual 
challenge. 
The first reveals an analytical question, even a theoretical problem: how is it relevant and 
interesting to look at political parties, as a special and unique form of political organization in 
contexts where they have been apprehended as structures of clientelist mobilization, 
communitarian or tribal, with little power over the political destiny of their societies?  
The second challenge is of empirical order: how to renew the reflection on the phenomenon of 
parties, in a context of scarcity and ageing of data? All of the recent works devoted to political 
parties in the region, within all disciplines, are not numerous. They deal with the history of these 
parties more than their sociology. We must therefore investigate, go to the field, and return to the 
parties, to try to understand some of the dynamics that are crossing them at present. 
In front of the transformations that characterize the scenes and the backstage of the Arab 
political arena, this dual challenge seems stimulating. Observers of the political changes in 
Eastern Europe or Latin America grant them a decisive role in the processes of contemporary 
democratic transitions. Some authors point out that the parties have been very closely associated 
with the rise of “Western representative democracies” - the party is then presented as “child of 
universal vote and democracy” (Weber, cited in Seiler, 2001). In the Arab world, other types of 
movements, mainly associations have been put at the forefront in the recent decades in terms of 
regime change. If we refuse to prejudge the democratization of the regimes that we are interested 
in, we do not rule out the hypothesis of a pluralization and liberalization of their political spaces. 
Instead, we propose to examine the various relationships between the development of political 
parties and political transformation - transformation of the regime or within the regime (Albrecht 
and Schlumberger, 2003).  
In the light of these issues, what is happening in the parties of North Africa and the Near East? 
We made the assumption that in a period where a “crisis of representation” was announced, they 
are particularly interesting places of observation of changes in political action, against a 
caricatured image of a political arena characterized by the confrontation between authoritarian 
regimes in search of second wind and Islamist movements, often presented quickly as dissident 
forces or, depending on the case, as non-democratic “in the absence of viable secular parties, 
political competition in the Arab world is reduced to a dangerous confrontation between 
Islamists and rulers” (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2007, p. 3). On the contrary, focus on the 
becoming of partisan life, including its unexplored aspects, its defeats and its pretenses, leads to 
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examining the changing patterns of political activism, of political competition and political 
socialization. It is from this perspective that the first chapter aims to think about partisan politics 
in the region. 
Note that if we chose to work in six Arab countries, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain 
and Yemen, we do not envision an “Arab space” of politics (Camau and Geisser, 2003, p. 19). 
Our reflection which draws upon the six countries is not confined to the borders of the Near 
East and North Africa. It does not claim to cover all situations in the region either. We seek 
instead to focus on what we learn from observation in these countries that present both 
similarities and differences: a first common denominator certainly lies in the logic of repression 
with which political parties may have been confronted with, and the context of limited pluralism 
in which they develop and evolve: a “feckless pluralism” (Carothers, 2002) which results in a 
disconnection between the governed and the political elite or a system of “dominant-power 
politics” (Linz and Stepan, 1996) where participation in political life is relatively closed and 
shallow and where the procedures for contestation are poorly institutionalized. The high-cost of 
the commitment determined directories of specific collective action (Geisser, Vairel and Karam, 
2006). Oddly, the academic literature has focused little on this issue.  
Several cases of this study emphasize the concurrence under which our area is subject to 
“sociation” which supposes partisan commitment. Far from withering away for the benefit of a 
voluntary collective action and formerly free one, do the communitarian and primordial 
solidarities “saturate” the substance of political relation? Are they obstacles in the development 
of a partisan system? Tribalism, ethnic or community networks, local, national or transnational 
‘asabiyyat, including their renewed forms, do they all take into charge more efficiently, the defense 
of interests and the voicing of demands beside the central political institutions ? (Picard, 2006, p. 
46)? 
But the case studies that we have chosen are also characterized by important differences, 
particularly regarding the conditions for invention of parties and the rules of the political game: 
some have experienced a colonial period and national movements whose legacy remains central; 
while others, such as Yemen or Bahrain, have been preserved from direct colonial domination 
(Burgat, 2005, p. 191). Some, Lebanon, Morocco, have since independence established a 
multiparty system, even if this system is sometimes drastically framed and limited not to mention 
defused (Tozy, 1999). Others like Algeria's National Liberation Front or Iraq‟s Arab and Socialist 
Baath, have been the scene of the implementation over several decades of a single party, 
sometimes called “State party”, any opposition or dissent being irretrievably taken down. In 
Bahrain, the party‟s activity itself remains forbidden until today. The influence of the socialist 
experience has also known very different avatars in each of these countries.  
It is in the light of these preliminary remarks that we propose to organize our thoughts, dealing 
with three issues: Are the political parties of these six countries undergoing a crisis? How have 
the partisan dynamics been affected by the formation of States in the region, and how is this 
legacy expressed today? Do “new parties” stand out today, especially in the vein of Islamist 
movements which seem to be reinvesting in partisan organization on many levels?  
 
ARE THE ARAB PARTIES UNDERGOING A CRISIS ?  
 
The theme of the “crisis of parties” or the crisis of the “partisan system” runs through the 
literature on these six countries. This fact echoes the generalization of the thesis of the decline of 
“classical” party1. Depending on the fields, some highlight the persistence of proto-parties (the 
parties never existed), and others foresee the development of post-partisan systems, with the 
study of innovative or alternative modes of collective action, social movements, networking, etc. 
(Lawson and Merkl, 1988). These issues come under the theme of “crisis of representation” 
(Catusse, 2004) or the crisis of some parties, notably “secular” parties (Ottaway and Hamzawi, 
2007). The presumed death of the parties (or some of them) or at least their ban, leads first to 
examine three issues raised within our fields:  
On the one hand, what are we taking about? Has the partisan paradigm been (wrongly) 
“imported” (Badie, 1992, p. 177), or used as a distorting mirror for political organizations that 
would not recognize themselves in it? 
On the other hand, what does the weakness of the parties consist of today? Empirically, has the 
partisan call become blunted? How do anti-partisan feelings and denunciations conjugate? In 
final, what are the political parties “counter-performances”?  
And finally, does the rhetoric on the crisis, denial, or death of the parties no occult the real place 
that central political organizations occupied and continue to occupy, the leftist movements of 
yesterday, the Islamist movements today?  
 
An object without interest? 
 
For nearly a century in most countries of the Arab world, political parties were formally 
instruments of public participation, political mobilization and elections. More precisely, the 
category “party” (hizb) is used to refer to political organizations, or to regulate their activities, as 
opposed to “clans” for example ('achira), to “communities” (tawâ'if), to “associations” (jam'iyyât), 
to political clubs (endiyya siyâsiyya), to enterprises (mu'sasât), to unions (naqabât), or interest groups 
etc. Often, it is in the context of the national struggle and then independence that the term stood 
out. This is the case of hizb al-Istiqlal (1943) in Morocco, the Lebanese Communist Party in 1924 
(el-hizb el shuyu'i el-lubnani), the Iraqi Communist Party (el-hizb el shuyu'i el-iraqi ) in 1934. Generic 
and used by the law, the label “party” remains challenged in practice. The names given to 
“parties” may also take other references: “front” like the FLN (jabhat al-tahrir al-watani) in Algeria 
(1954), “movement” (haraka), “gathering” (tajjamu'), “current” (tayyar), “union” (ittihad), 
“organization” (tanzim), etc. 
The partisan structure was also established - or not - through the bias of the law and its 
normalization: after the “second-liberal era” (Salamé, 1991, p. 319 et seq.), struggles for 
independence and development of Arab nationalism, political organizations quickly fell under the 
laws on “political parties” and continue to be with the adoption of new laws, according to the 
transformation of regimes (in Morocco (1996, 2005, 2006), in Algeria (1989, 1997, 2002, 2008), in 
Yemen (1991, 2001), in Iraq (1960, 1971, 1991,2004 and 2005)) - and / or on associations (in 
Lebanon (1909)), in Bahrain (2006). Some political organizations are banned in the name of the 
prohibition of political parties, often by reference to the fear of the fitna, the division of social 
body of the nation or community. This holds true in regimes that were formed out of nationalist 
movements (the single party as embodying the nation as a whole, beyond its divisions), but not 
only that. In Bahrain for example, between 1975 and 1999, all partisan activity was banned. The 
law on communitarian associations (ahliyya) of 1999 prohibited the formation of religious 
association on a partisan basis and the 2005 law on political associations did not recognize any 
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political association with a religious base2. In Yemen, the contributors to this book stress that the 
reference to “partisan spirit” (al-hizbiyya) was connoted disapprovingly: “in the collective 
representations, the reference to the party is associated with the division, corruption and 
exclusive and close allegiances. In the 1980s, the Yemeni contemporary political scene was largely 
influenced and dominated by the formula of the General People's Congress out of which, at least 
formally, the structure of partisan or call to hizb in the name of solidarity transgressed - and 
stigmatized - the partisan divide.”3 In Iraq, with the establishment of the Baathist regime, the 
parties could not develop outside a limited and controlled National Front (al-jabha al-wataniyya). In 
Lebanon, the Syrian Nationalist Social Party (al-hizb as-suri al-qawmî-al-ijtima'i) is prohibited from 
1949 to 1971. In other cases, on the contrary, as in the Moroccan elections of 1997 and the 
following, candidates without party affiliation are compelled to join partisan forms to run.  
The media also contributed to the naturalization of “party.” They used the term in a quite 
consensual manner, and attributed an important place to partisan activities in their political pages. 
Indeed, the history of the partisan press - and wider partisan media - is rich in the region and has 
contributed greatly to informing political debates and voicing their intellectuals and ideologues 
(Aflaq, 1978, Qutb*, 1990, Qasim, 2005). This is verified in our field, including contexts of 
censorship. Each of the two main political associations in Bahrain has a magazine, the association 
al-minbar al-taqadumi publishes the magazine akhbar al-minbar, and the association al-'amal al-
dimuqrati publishes the magazine al-majala al-dimuqratiyya (Al-Murshed (2008)) ; in Morocco, 
political parties have their own official organs, such as ittihad ishtiraki and Libération for the USFP, 
al-'alem and L’Opinion for the Istiqlal, in addition to at-tajdid for the Party of the justice and 
development, etc. In Lebanon, the television channel El Manar is a media tool for Hezbollah, 
Future TV for the Future movement, OTV for the Free Patriotic Movement, and so on 
(Lamloum, 2008; 2009). In Yemen, the weekly al-sahwa and al-madina are the organs of al-islah.  
In summary, the object “party” is certainly not a “new” object itself in the Arab world. On the 
contrary, it delimits and is delimited by a political arena for actors (who create parties or criticize 
them), which draws on a century of political history (a history shorter in the case of Bahrain 
however).  
Yet the object “political party” has long been regarded in the region as unworthy of attention,, 
especially from social and political sciences. It must be said that research on the partisan 
phenomenon was hampered by the regimes and even by political parties themselves, reluctant to 
self-criticism (Malki*, 2008). Despite pioneering work (Waterbury, 1970; Batatu 1978), recent 
studies documented on the parties in the Arab world are few. They essentially take three forms: a 
history of political thought (Hourani 1962, Abdel-Malek 1969, Al-Douri* 1984, Salamé 1987, 
Khalidi et al. 1991); partisan monographs exist (Darraj and Barout*, 1997, 1999, 2000) but they 
are not legion and often stop at the years 1970/1980; at last biographies of leaders, the fate of the 
man often mistaken for that of the organization he led (Abdel-Malek, 1970, etc.).  
The recent numerical development of political parties, and the contemporary mutations in Arab 
regimes have caused a prudent regain of interest for the object. Over the past ten years, some 
works in social science point out new problems and renew approaches4. Monographs of parties 
or political currents denote the displacement of interest of the scientific community and political 
actors (Eshtay* 1997; Charara*1996; Norton, 1999; Kienle, 1990; Tozy 1999, Mallat*, 1993). The 
                                               
2 See study of al-Minbar el-Islami by A. El-Murshed* (2008). 
3 See the contribution of L. Bonnefoy and M. Poirier to this volume 
* The references followed by an asterisk (*) refer back to the bibliography in Arabic. 
4 Today some publications, recent gatherings and research programs reveal a regain of interest. By witnessing 
the two tomes of the REMMM (1998, 2006), the conferences and publications of the LCPS (2002; 2006), and 
the research program of the Institute for Strategic Studies, etc. See: Aboujaoudé, 1985 ; Malki*, 1993 ; Eshtay*, 
1997; Abdel-Jabbar, 2003a-b; etc.  
development of Islamist organizations attracted the most attention. Nevertheless, they remain 
relatively marginal compared to studies that focus or have focused on political currents5 and 
more recently on economic elites (Kienle 2003; Heydemann , 2004; Catusse 2008, etc.), 
elections (Gamblin, 1997; Legrain, 1999; LCPS*, 1998; 2002; 2007; Bennani-Chraïbi and 
alii, 2004; Favier, 2001, etc.) or associative structures (Bianchi, 1989; Norton , 1995; 
Carapico, 1998; Ben Nefissa, 2002; Karam, 2006, etc.]. 
Few studies focus on forms of militancy within the party structures, on the recruitment, the 
sociology of militants (Favier 2004; Bennani Chraïbi, 2008), as if “the parties” were emptied of 
people and amounted to their leaders or even to personalized clans or networks. This is the thesis 
of F. El-Khazen (2003), in Lebanon, who describes political parties “in search of partisanship.” 
However, exploration of political staff brings to light the shifting of sociological cleavages, the 
transformation of the logic of collective action within and around the parties. This is evident in 
the recent work of M. Bennani-Chraibi (2007) in Morocco and its contribution in this work: they 
allow to put in parallel diachronically and synchronically militancy that some tend to oppose: the 
Islamist versus Marxist militancy, or the involvement in political parties versus associations.  
Major trends in the literature (in Arabic as in other languages) show us two periods of scientific 
production on political parties. They reflect the role of political parties in each sociopolitical 
context. The first period of high interest on the subject developed in the mid-sixties to mid-
seventies, when the regimes stabilized. It was informed on the one hand by the research on 
political modernization, and on the other hand by the pluralization of political scenes in the 
aftermath of independence in several of these countries. The second is more recent: it starts in 
the nineties, when the liberalization is listed at the top of the reform agenda of regimes. The issue 
of political Islam began to grab the interest of observers. The number of parties on each of our 
fields then increased considerably, either because of the withdrawal of the single party system 
(Algeria), the permission to create autonomous political parties (Iraq, Bahrain, North Yemen and 
South Yemen etc.) or because of successive divisions (Morocco, Iraq).6  
Thus in Bahrain, eight political organizations (tanzimat siyasiyya) in 1973, not recognized as a 
parties, increase to fifteen political associations (jam'iyyat siyasiyya) in 2007. In Algeria, through the 
“Spring of Algiers” in 1988, over 60 new parties are registered, before some are prohibited in 
1992 (first and foremost the FIS). Between 1990 and 1991, with the reunification, the number of 
Yemeni political parties also grew: the two- hegemonic party systems that characterized North 
Yemen (General People's Congress) and South Yemen (Socialist Party) came to be substituted by 
a multiparty system with about forty official and recognized parties. In Morocco, with the help of 
each election, the number of parties grew: 30 in the 2009 legislative elections. For that matter, 
observers of the Moroccan politics speak of “scissiparity” and “atomization of the partisan 
field”(Santucci, 2006b). The creation of “new” parties often translates lengthy “fraternal” 
dissidence or old “filial” frustrations, that the framework of the internal life of the party cannot 
solve (idem.). For A. Khatibi (1998), this multiplication of political parties, by splitting and 
successive cloning, expresses the predominance of a pervasive culture of authority that creates 
the bond of the political community with “ birthright and patriarchy”, and as a result that 
legitimizes any new political party based on the same principle, namely “the creation of another 
symbolic lineage.”  
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This cautious return to the party, of both political actors as well as research, is accompanied by a 
questioning of the relevance of the concept. Thus, in the special issue of Revue des Mondes 
Musulmans et de la Méditerranée (REMMM) on political parties in the Maghreb (Baduel and Catusse, 
2006), all contributions collected do not specifically tackle the parties. In the case of Libya, Mr. 
Djaziri (2006) questions the point of using this concept to describe political organizations while 
partisan activity is prohibited and punishable by death. The same question arises in this volume in 
the case of Bahrain. Two other contributions in this issue of REMMM focus on political 
movements that do not take the partisan form. In the case of 'arch in Algeria, K. Dirèche-Slimani 
(2006) thinks that we are facing new names, actors and practices that “upset the traditional 
representations of politics in Kabylian and Algerian milieu‟s”. We find this problem in many 
cases in the region, where after all, the supply of various political organizations is particularly 
dense: political parties look pale in comparison with the development of protests, and other 
forms of outsiders politics, advocacy organizations and social movements (Karam, 2006; Bennani 
Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2003; Geisser, Karam and Vairel, 2006). In the case of Moroccan agrarian 
corporatism, T. Desrues (2006) shows that this is precisely a kind of mobilization that refused the 
partisan form: “the corporatist formula which tried to become institutionalized [in the domain of 
agrarian politics in Morocco] provides, without considering the risk of competition and political 
concurrence, a control of the profession as well as a monopoly and a personalization of 
representation.” We will have the opportunity to re-discuss these two arguments along with other 
examples.  
Other cases show that using the party as a reference relates to multiple processes. Like was 
formerly the case of European communist parties (Kriegel, 1970), parties are sometimes set up to 
be capitalized and singularized: this is often in the context of a single party, but also in Lebanon 
today hizb allah is commonly called „the party‟ (al-hizb). Nevertheless, the article by Catherine Le 
Thomas in this book or articles from other authors show that precisely in this case, the labeling 
of “party” may be simplistic or inaccurate to describe the social and political activities, as well as 
religious and military activities, that come into play or in this nebulous “satellite” organizations 
(Harb, 2005, p. 167), that some authors compare to a “counter- society” (Charara*, 1996) 
North Africa and the Middle East have also been the scene for a reflection on “protoparties” in 
the region, a re-actualization of the concept of M. Weber (Camau and Geisser, 2003).7 Thus, the 
societies which we have examined have experienced the blossoming of “parties”, which are often 
described as elitist groups more committed to the pursuit of profits and places of choice in the 
channels of cooptation and redistribution, than to the deliberate will of national and local leaders 
of the organization to take and exercise power, alone or with others, and not simply to influence 
power; at the concern to seek popular support through elections or any other way (The 
Palombara and Weiner, 1966). It would be rather by renouncing ambition and the exercise of the 
power that these organizations would find themselves a place in the political arena. In the case of 
Jordan, Mr. Shtuway* (2006) notes that almost the majority of the founders of political parties 
that emerged after 1992 [the date of approval of political parties and multiparty system] are the 
old bureaucratic elites of the State. Some have sought to create a state party, using these 
structures to reinvest public institutions in the era of democracy. That is why these parties 
remained elitist. Their membership is related to the calculation of what they could make in terms 
of personal political benefit. In Yemen, the development of the Yemeni Gathering for Reform 
(al-islah) starting 1990 (again the year when multiparty system is allowed) is played out in waltz-
like hesitation with public authorities. As the contribution of L. Bonnefoy and M. Poirier in this 
book shows, “discreet, peaceful and intellectual”, the elite of the party manages its inclusion in 
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the intricacies of power, “a political scene that pluralizes (through the institutionalization of the 
opposition) and that „de-pluralizes‟ at the same time (through the monopolization of resources by 
the government).” 
Plus, if since 2003 [the U.S. invasion and fall of the Baathist regime], the number of declared 
Iraqi parties exceeded 200, “few of them have a history and a remarkable political activity and are 
taken into consideration on the Iraqi political scene. Most of them are just political slogans. For 
this reason, it is difficult to classify them, as they have no clear activity that could indicate their 
ideological orientation, no communication, and some of them do not even have local 
headquarters.”8  
This raises the issue of labeling and the construction of the category “political party”, underlined 
by the different contributions of this volume. This is particularly interesting given that “the game 
on words are [certainly] more present in countries in which political organizations have not been 
yet stabilized” (Offerlé, 1987, p. 7). 
These doubts about the uses of the concept and therefore about its scientific value and the 
obvious risk of conceptual stretching deserve attention. A category of analysis or labeling or 
stigma in the political competition (ibidem), a marker of identity, and sometimes a mobilization 
tool even a manipulation tool, the “political party” is polymorphic. This pushes to question 
seriously the conditions of the “return to the party” that we propose: if we find it pertinent and 
useful to open the file of the partisan phenomena in the region – be it only because these actors 
organize themselves on behalf of political parties -, we should take it into consideration: it is less 
about (re) discovering a “new political object”, even less giving meaning to shells emptied from 
their content, than to look at it as an original and plural fabric of politics to be analyzed as such.  
 
Failure of parties  
 
Besides the question of the definition of political party, the readings then show that not only is 
the partisan object often considered without interest in the region, but also that the political 
parties are left out by the observers. This lead to analysis that is often normative, which has the 
disadvantage of implicitly or explicitly disqualifying the object of the study (if this can be justified 
in the context of actual political action, this is very annoying from a strict approach of social 
sciences).  
 
The weakness of parties  
Indeed, the view shared by the works is that of the “weakness of political parties” in the fields of 
our investigation. It is about a common place that we locate elsewhere (Fretel and Lefebvre, 
2004). It is here aggravated by the extreme limitation of pluralism in which the parties develop. 
According to F. Abdel-Jabbar, two elements have contributed to the “weakening” of the Iraqi 
Communist Party: the repressive apparatus of the Baathist regime in 1970-1980 and from 2003, 
the strengthening of political and militia violence, the confessional conflict and the development 
of conservative Islamist movements, which have undermined the popular base of the party.9 
Paradoxically, it is against all this that the Communist Party now hopes to strengthen its project. 
This is the same evidence that M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawi (2007, p. 1) bring forward: 
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“Conditions in most Arab countries are quite difficult for secular parties, just as they are for any 
political organization seeking to act independently of a government or even more to challenge a 
government. But the crisis of secular parties is also in part of their own making.”  
Asserting that political parties are weak certainly is a matter for sociological explanation. Many 
elements prove that, even if the question remains on what scale this strength or weakness is 
measured. But it is also a discourse and positioning of political actors:  
Within the parties, the argument is often used, particularly at the time of tension and internal 
crises, not to mention splitting: this is the case of the Lebanese Communist Party in 2005, in the 
upheaval that followed the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister. A dissident group 
denounced “the line taken by the party that led to catastrophic results, which affected the party 
and its supporters. Its effectiveness has been reduced to nothingness, isolated from the people 
and far from any intellectual or political influence, its role has been weakened, its alliance with 
groups close to its ideological family defeated”10 The “anti-party” discourse and the discrediting 
of partisan systems still function, used both by “outsiders” as much as by “insiders” and public 
authorities. It is largely fueled by opinion makers.  
Basically, the arguments made about this weakness that would prevent the parties to play the role 
that is “expected of them,” are many: the authors denounce their organizational weakness. Parties 
are often described as poorly organized, highly personalized, if not at the service of a man, a 
family, or a clan like the Takritis for the Iraqi Baath (Luizard, 1998) or a confessional or ethnic 
community (on Lebanon: El-Khazen* 2002). Parties are often characterized by a low degree of 
institutionalization, scattered militants, and fragile resources. Many of them do not come alive 
and become consistent except during election campaigns. Their ideologies are weak. Finally, they 
would only rarely be able to secure, monitor, and control effective collective mobilizations. In 
other words, according to these authors, parties are mainly empty shells which would also justify 
in many studies their anthropomorphism (“the party” has said or has done) and the reduction of 
partisan life to the activities of their leaders. This finding is not limited to the fields in which we 
worked.11  
 
The malfunctioning of party  
Another argument regarding the parties in the region lies in the denunciation of their 
“malfunctioning.” This argument is sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit: the party does not 
function like a “real” party. Alternatively, the parties “are no longer what they used to be” in 
reference to a golden age often de-historicized, to go quickly, the Arab liberal age (Salamé, 1991, 
1994). 
On this basis, the political parties in Arab countries are not always considered like that by 
analysts. They consider them as elements of authoritarianism, poorly organized for the conquest 
of power and replicating within them authoritarian and personalized behavior, without being able 
to create a civic conscience. The developmentalist literature made of Arab parties‟ importations 
which would be difficult to transplant in political societies where civil representation is challenged 
by primordial solidarities, familial, clan, ethnic or communitarian. For B. Badie (1989) for 
example, three features of political parties would be “in-exportable” because shaped by the 
European political history: the “sociation” in Weber‟s sense (the decline of communitarian 
societies); the articulation between the development of political parties, the enterprise of 
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conquest of power and electoral mobilization; finally, “the partisan game” which would impose 
itself to other divisions (Charaf Eddin*, 2006, and El-Kourani*, 2004). 
These arguments are not satisfying, either empirically or theoretically. Culturalist explanations 
(the distrust of Islam from division, the quest for the Umma) produce de-historicized 
explanations. The weight of the history in the fragile formation of Nation-States and the stigma 
of the single-party are certainly more interesting to discuss. In fact, revolutions and struggles for 
independence have largely contributed to set up the political arenas where conflict (and partition) 
is not institutionalized, where unanimity is embodied in the form of State party by the 
independent and revolutionary State: this is the case of the Algerian FLN, but also the Iraqi Baath 
(Batatu, 1978; Devlin, 1976) where the contrast is strong between partisan excitement in the 
aftermath of independence, the expression of strong differences (right left; tradition / modernity, 
conservatism / progressivism, urban elites / new middle classes; pro-occident/pro-soviet; 
capitalism / socialism, religion / secularism, etc..) and the “lead weight that falls down” a decade 
later (Picard, 1996). The Baath party and the “clique” that directed them eliminated all forms of 
contestation even within the party (Luizard, 1998). Can we still talk of a party then? The ambition 
of a monopolist party is that of power without sharing, without alternating, without competition: 
“promoted basic authorities of the State, its nature has changed. A number of political scientists 
designate it by the term “party-state” -and the hyphen is essential. Not in any case can we 
consider the party-states as systems of parties” (Seiler, 2001, p. 7). From organizational 
representation of interests and from ideas involved in political competition, it becomes a central 
hub of the power apparatus, regulating in a total manner the political and social life. 
In other cases, if the functioning of parties is not put to question, it is the partisan system itself 
that is described as dysfunctional: J.C. Santucci (2006b) describes a Moroccan multiparty system 
as a purely symbolic system of personal foil or instrument of political control. He shows how the 
recurrent and exponential multiplication of political parties in the country is caused by a 
scissiparity which fed the feckless pluralism: while keeping the rotation and the competition for 
power outside the will of their citizens, public authorities tolerate some kind of opposition and 
political expression as long as it does not call into question the legitimacy of leadership. This 
thesis is still shared by many authors: in order to better control the political game, the monarchy 
is trying to “accompany” the emergence of social conflicts that the birth of a party seeks in 
principle to translate. In contrast to what one may describe such as “partisanization” of the 
political scene in Eastern Europe during the last decade (Heurtaux, 2005), here, the hyper 
multiplication of the partisan offer disfavors the role of parties. In a game that is becoming loose, 
they are unable to monopolize the political game. Even in the case of Lebanon, where political 
life is largely governed by partisan organizations, they are often described as limited by 
confessional representation, even reduced to organizations in the service of a man or a family.  
In sum, the monist and unanimous representation of society - and the State - driven by national 
movements, revolutionary movements or the monarchal institution has de-legitimized, in many 
cases, the partisan representation of the political society (or of parts of the society). Hegemonic 
party, in Algeria and Iraq who have hampered the partisan life, are characterized by a grip on 
society, a “nationalization” of society. And where multiparty system developed, it is essentially as 
a feckless or limited pluralism, the real power lying elsewhere than in the partisan arena (at the 
Palace, in the case of Morocco, in the communities in the case of Lebanon).  
 
The absence of democracy and civil society?  
Defects attributed to partisan organizations and systems in the region have also often been 
associated with two “gaps” that political societies would suffer: a lack of democracy and a lack of 
civil society. We will not dwell here on the rich literature that these issues have aroused (Bishara*, 
1998), nor the contrasting positions to which they gave rise. This debate (“why the Arab world is 
not democratic?” (Salamé, 1991)) has weighed on the marginalization of political parties for two 
decades.  
We have already stressed that, intimately associated with the history of representative 
democracies, parties are generally presented as necessary elements for the emergence and 
development of the latter. On the one hand, the structuring and institutionalization of partisan 
systems has contributed to the organization of political competition; and on the other hand the 
form that political life takes in representative democracies has promoted the rational and 
bureaucratic structure of modern political parties (Gaxie, 1996). Political activity professionalized 
in favor of the institutionalization of partisan structures. And on two privileged arenas, the 
Parliament and the elections, political parties have imposed themselves as vital organizations, 
which think and organize representative democracy: they intervene in the regulation of political 
life (for example by making the “political rights”, electoral laws, laws on political parties, on 
public life financing, etc.). They are also, in theory at least, the central channels for regulating the 
circulation of elites, by selecting the political personnel etc.. 
This short term story, geographically situated, is sometimes risen in generality to explain, in 
reverse, the weakness or dysfunction of partisan systems in other parts of the world, and the 
Arab world in particular (Baduel, 1996, El Kourani*, 2004). Two points are emphasized by these 
authors: first, the parties could not develop because of the authoritarian characteristic of the 
system: either because they were banned (the cost of collective action is then exorbitant), or 
because they are diverted from their functions. J. Waterbury (1970) for instance said that in 
Morocco, “opposition to His Majesty” became in favor of the segmentarism of the system, “His 
Majesty‟s opposition”. In this context, the voice of the majority is competed by the call for 
unanimity. Second, and conversely, the absence of partisan life could strengthen the authoritarian 
regime: “The crisis of secular parties is emerging as a major obstacle to democratic 
transformation in the Arab world” (Ottaway and Hamzawi, 2007, p. 2). These approaches help to 
explain how the party system and political system are narrowly interrelated. But they are also 
tautological, even simplistic for some, since if we can show that in Occident history of 
democracies, and partisan histories are particularly mixed, it remains difficult to defend that they 
are necessarily and univocally related (Manin, 1996). From this point of view, the undeniable 
partisan life (even if ) “imperfect” in Arab world, can actually finely document the modalities of 
an authoritarian and limited multiparty system (Santucci, 2006a). 
Another defect is allegedly burdens partisan life in Arab societies: the difficult formation of a civil 
society and the importance on the contrary of the weight of notables. Some authors analyze the 
use of the concept of civil society and its media coverage in Arab countries as a simple imported 
project and a rallying cry without deep socio-historical roots, even a new ideological tool in the 
hands of some Arab intellectuals facing the failure of modernizing projects and strengthening of 
the Islamist discourse (Bishara*, 1998, p. 271). In our case, in front of the inflation of discourse 
on civil society, and in front of the rise of mobilizations “in the name of civil society” that 
contrast with the deflation of references to political parties, the debate lies elsewhere: Several 
authors have described, in European contexts particularly, the emergence of the party system as 
the transition from the dominance of parliamentarians over the parties to the domination of the 
parties over the parliamentarians (Duverger, 1992); the counterbalance of power of the notables 
would be the empowerment of civil society. On the contrary in our fields of study, observers 
often insist not only on the personalization of political function, but also on the weak articulation 
between political society and civil society. In the case that interests us, it is less its improbable or 
imported character, than the weakness in the political space of claims by associations or 
movements called “civil society” that concerns us.  
On one hand, partisan identities appear to remain fragile and badly tied to the construction of 
causes in civil society. At least, this is what several contributions to this volume highlight. Groups 
have difficulty organizing mobilizations around social cleavages, even more freezing these 
cleavages in the words of S. Lipset and S. Rokkan (1967). This is what M. Djaziri (1997) indicates 
about political parties in the Maghreb. This is also noted in the sections following, by the studies 
on the Yemeni Gathering for Reform (al-Islah) in Yemen or the Justice and Development Party 
(PJD) in Morocco. The first gathers tribal elites, merchants, and religious people around a flexible 
and adaptable ideology.12 The second tends to euphemize, regarding municipal business at least, 
its relation to Islam and its social discourse. Valorizing instead a managerial discourse and “moral 
clientelism”, it turns to heterogeneous voters.13 In the case of the contemporary Lebanese 
Communist Party, C. and F. Eshtay* (2008) show that the stated priority of the struggle is more 
over the refusal of sectarian division than the defense of a class interest, because for Lebanese 
communists the sectarian divisions would prevent the expression of social cleavages.14 
On the other hand, political formations are often organized around and sometimes at the service 
of one man (Messara 1996), notables, families, clans, groups that adapt and adopt new clothes 
according to the transformations of the political scene: the Hamula in Palestine (Legrain, 1996), 
ta’ifa (communities) in Lebanon [Picard, 1994, Messara 1996], the reinvented 'asabiyya (Seurat, 
1985), etc. According to this perspective, the “politics of the name” trumps “the politics of 
number” (or of majority): the leaders and families; and not political parties, eventually 
monopolize the mobilization and political representation. It occurs for instance in Lebanese 
political parties, where transmission of partisan responsibility by blood ties (and sometimes in the 
name of bloodshed) is common. It is also observed in the tribal identification of certain parties.  
Whatever it is, these approaches must be nuanced. Recent studies show how the figures and the 
criteria of notability transform and embrace the changes of the partisan system (Favier, 2003). 
Parties themselves create their notables, who are more or less faithful depending on the case.15 In 
parallel, activist identities speak forcefully and translate divisions or social conflict, sometimes 
with heavy repression: in a nutshell, leftist movements yesterday, Islamist movements today.  
 
Yet they mobilize...  
 
In summary, the parties in these countries are political objects that are “misidentified”, suspected 
with inconsistency, structural weaknesses, and victims of of the authoritarian regimes that 
developed during the twentieth century. But, as pointed out by Kh. Suleiman* (2004, p. 436) in a 
stimulating conclusion of a book on the internal democracy of the Arab parties, the question of 
whether or not there are political parties in the Arab world is not very enlightening. “Otherwise, 
what should we call these dozens of organizations that claim body and soul tribute to political 
parties?” (Ibid.).  
The political scenes of countries in our study are led by organizations that mobilize and 
contribute to regulate the political game on behalf of partisan identity. They cannot be reduced to 
the parties playing the electoral game - many are excluded or have distanced themselves from the 
electoral race -: they have all housed and generated various activisms. Despite the lack of 
credibility or trust brought out in investigations on political parties, the abstention rate has often 
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risen in the latest polls16, and other indications of “the crisis of the parties”, some of Arab 
political parties continue to ensure structures of commitment and leadership, especially at 
election time. Hence the need to abandon an “objectifying” and univocal conception of parties, 
and to consider the variety of cases, to study some parties that are not necessarily under the 
spotlight, which are witnessing the transformations and constraints facing the political processes 
as much as the most studied political groups.  
 
THE PATH OF HISTORY  
 
The approach we adopted in this book privileges a historical perspective. To enter the partisan 
transformation scenes, is to understand how the development of political parties and their 
current metamorphosis are intimately inscribed in the history of State formation in the region. At 
a comparative level, the concern of historicizing allows us to explore recurring forms or 
innovative features in recent partisan formations.  
In front of the pluralization of political scenes, and beyond discourse on “democratization” or 
“the crises of the parties”, two types of histories on the partisan phenomenon in the region 
emerge. Like the studies compiled in this book, most contemporary works evoke a recent 
“transformation” or “change”, compared to an earlier period, that of “old regime”, which would 
determine in part the contemporary socio-political context. So much so that two historicities 
seem to have combined: that of time short of contemporary mutations, sometimes under the 
hypothesis of democratization, and sometimes reread in terms of authoritarian reform; that of a 
long time of formation of political regimes, of the singularity of chosen trajectories, of the 
reinterpretation of primary solidarities and modern political identities. It is in the interlacing of 
this long history and this short history that the stakes of a metamorphosis of the Arab parties can 
be understood. The first wears the glasses of comparison with the international reformist agenda; 
the second, on the contrary, re-embeds parties in their social, historical contexts, or even in 
specific places.  
 
Short histories that resemble each other  
 
At first glance, the recent trajectories of Arab partisan societies prove remarkably similar. In the 
six countries of the study, leaders and activists of political parties are engaged in a new deal, with 
different stakes that vary depending on the case: “Alternance” with the nomination of a socialist 
Prime Minister in Morocco, the instauration of multiparty politics, the interruption of the 
electoral process and the search for “civil concord” in Algeria, the output of the Lebanese civil 
war, the unification of the two Yemen‟s, the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the 
developing a new “national pact” in Bahrain. It seems that the redefinition of “political pacts” 
(Leca, 1994) or the development of novel political contracts is at play. This new deal for the 
parties (and perhaps the new areas of action and legitimating that are being drawn) falls at the 
intersection of three main processes: those of the internal dynamics of parties, those of the 
changing rules of partisanship, and finally those of international influences.  
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Internal dynamics:  
The investigation of what J. Charlot (1989, p. 361) called the “hidden side” of parties, their lives 
internally, backstage, has not given rise to many studies on our fields. In the case of Turkey, S. 
Vaner (1985, p. 5) makes the same claim. He explains this by the fact that, in this case, this 
provides little key to their differentiation: most of the parties in Turkey are cadre parties, not very 
keen to seek new members (Massicard, 2007, p. 8). It is certainly less the case in the Arab world, 
at least in the field of our investigation. But for lack of reliable and fine data, it is not easy to 
show, beyond the conventional discourse on parties.  
It is true that partisan organizations might not open their doors easily. In addition to opacity or 
withholding information which certain organizations prove strategically to be, access to the field 
is largely conditioned by the constraints of repressive regimes and the careful reflexes they can 
generate. Proximity to the field or permission to investigate on the part of the organization is 
often necessary to maintain a presence of long observation. This has the advantage of having the 
means to enter into the mysteries of the party, to be familiar, to understand the codes, or culture, 
tacit and explicit. But this in return can reduce the effective critical distancing needed for analysis 
or even lead to different forms of censorship in the restitution of findings. 
Based on available surveys, some big common tendencies are distinguished. We will merely point 
out here those that seem most interesting.  
On the one hand, many partisan formations are seeking a second wind to face the alienation they 
suffer and the trend towards professionalization of their militants. In most of the case, the 
number of their militants rarefied even though, paradoxically, the pluralization of the political 
scenes gives them more leeway to act in politics. At the moment of the election process, this 
results, not only in the high abstention rate, but also in parties‟ searching for candidates, or even 
in seeking the help of salaried staff unrelated the party. It is also expressed in the fragility of 
partisan loyalty (known as “nomad partisan” in Morocco) in contrast to the inverse forms of 
militancy far more radical and committed which we observe in fewer cases. As for partisan 
activism, it became more professionalized, salaried even functionalized. If in some cases this is 
evidence of a lack of mobilization (benevolent activism would no longer be what it was) in other 
cases, it is described by observers as by militant partisans themselves, as the pledge of a superior 
political efficacy: that is the case of the PJD in Morocco, where local elected officials, and all the 
partisan formation, highlight their political virginity (their involvement would be quite recent), 
but also the professionalization of their elected activities to which they would devote themselves 
totally.17  
On the other hand, the recruitment of political personnel plays an important role in partisan 
transformations The centralization of partisan devices, their personalization, continues to be 
highlighted. However, the institutionalization of absolute power of management, expressed for 
example in the organization of uncompetitive congresses without stakes, is not always the rule. In 
generational terms, the ruling of the Arab parties, often coming from the militancy of the 
1950/1960‟s, are nowadays brought to renew themselves. Thus, most of the papers in this 
volume reflect tension in management, the expression of opposing currents, the old guard being 
sometimes reversed or at least marginalized, weakened as in the case of al-Islah in Yemen or Al-
Wefaq (National Islamic Society) in Bahrain or the Moroccan USFP. In the new parties, the 
leadership is not always uniform. Unlike the images of purges or exclusion conveyed for example 
on the Baathist Iraqi and Syrian parties, the link between the party and its elected officials is often 
floating and negotiated. Candidate selection is variable: it may be an object of bargaining or less 
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negotiation between the national governing bodies of the party and local notables18: it can arise 
from consultation with “the base” but to be subjected to a rigorous selection, conform with the 
representation that the party leadership wants to give him, as in the case of the Moroccan PJD.19 
However, studies on the members and party activists are virtually absent. Hence the great value 
of the work initiated recently by Bennani-Chraibi20, on the political personnel of Moroccan 
parties, unmatched on the scale of the region. Combining the quantitative treatment of data on 
activist trajectories and qualitative analysis, it can examine with unpublished and precise data, the 
process of diversification of the recruitment of Moroccan political personnel. In her contribution 
to this book, she reveals how the Socialist Union of Popular Forces experiences a notabilization 
of its political leadership: the former party of militants has been transformed into a party of 
notables.  
More generally, observers often confuse the supporter, the member, the frame, the militant, or 
the reader of the partisan press or the client of the local or national political leader. This is more 
the case, given that the conditions of partisan membership are being blurred, informal and poorly 
defined, as they are sometimes hidden when the party is illegal, or as it reveals in the case of 
Lebanese Hizbollah as do some communist parties (Kriegel, 1970, p. 214-220), procedures are 
not disclosed. Entering the party may include initiation. In all cases, it produces social and 
political identities. The chapter of C. Le Thomas in this book demonstrates that the latter emerge 
in structures of socialization, of controlling or of training that do not necessarily stop strictly at 
the narrow frontiers of the party.  
After having given rise to a lot of work until the 1970/1980‟s (Hottinger, 1961, 1966; Gubser, 
1973, Johnson 1986; Gilsenan, 1986), studies of leadership of parties became few in number. 
Even if most of them highlight the often oligarchic organization of political groups, recent work, 
for example in the Middle East, show that the figures of leaders or zu'amâ„ of yesterday do not 
have the same characteristics as those of today. Not only is the inheritance relationships between 
za‘ïm and his followers combining with generational effects, but the institution of zu'amâ', by 
which a leader ensures the loyalty of the local community in exchange of economic redistribution 
and defense of the community interests, is also changing with the transformations of political 
economy (Picard, 2001). This translates also within partisan structures, especially when weakly 
institutionalized, by finding new resources, strategies, and qualities on the part of the leaders. This 
is even more striking when, at the disappearance of their fathers, new executives and leaders seek 
to revive not only their social networks within and outside the party, but the charismatic 
dimension of their power.  
Finally, in terms of internal dynamics, the problems of the use of weapons proves to be 
determinant in several cases: in some cases it is about disarming militias (for example, the post 
war in Lebanon), going from armed mode to peaceful modes of political regulation (in Lebanon 
but also in the case of Yemen after unification); while in other cases on the contrary, partisan 
activism takes up arms and radicalizes its action like in Iraq, in the period following the fall of S. 
Hussein, either to protect or impose or oppose.  
Beyond that is the question of partisan resources. As noted by E. Massicard (2007, p. 12 and ss.) 
regarding the state of knowledge on Turkish political parties, it can translate into two dimensions: 
those of the collective resources of parties and those of the individual capital of their members. 
Their financial resources are little known. Emphasis tends to be placed on resources they may 
collectively control: the conquest or the preservation of political posts, elective or administrative; 
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social anchoring of associations or other structures, if not enrollment at least fidelity: The tribe 
(in Yemen in particular), the confessional community (in Lebanon, in Iraq), or even ethnic group. 
For instance, we count in Iraq after 2003, twelve new Christian political formations, fourteen 
Turkmen, and four Kurds (Jameel and Abdel-Jabbar*, 2008); in Algeria, the gathering for culture 
and democracy, is not explicitly Berber, but carrying cultural claims to the Berbers in Kabylia.  
Nevertheless, the remarkable introduction of measures of regulatory action of party finances in 
the new laws on parties and elections constitutes a new situation for the party life of several 
countries in our survey. It cuts both ways: firstly, it addresses a concern for transparency in the 
partisan world and its resources: but on the other hand, it often plays like a sword of Damocles in 
the hands of public power, which see here new ways to legally interfere in the internal affairs of 
political parties, notably their challengers. 
 
The rules of the partisan game 
Contemporary partisan scenes also share reform packages that are substantially similar: rather 
than dealing with the liberalization or “de-liberalization” (Kienle, 2001) of the political regimes, in 
general terms, we focused on the evolution of structures of political opportunities (Tarrow 1998) 
that represent renovations or changes in the legislative framework within which partisan actors 
act. In this case, the latter have accelerated over the last decade.  
Let us mention first the adoption of new constitutions, often with referendums on which the 
competing political parties have spoken (Morocco, 1996, Bahrain, 2002, Yemen, 1990, 1994, 
2001, Algeria, 1996, 2002, 2008; Iraq, 2005, Lebanon, 1990). In Lebanon, Yemen and Algeria, it is 
less about pluralizing the political arena than to end a civil conflict and endorse by that the new 
common rules around a political pact: “It sets rather the preconditions for different Political 
supplies to be self-restrained and consistent enough not to be considered by the other party, or 
parties, as an unacceptable threat that would justify the breach of 'democratic rules'” (Leca, 1994, 
p. 36). In other cases, the adoption of this new political framework is in search of a regulation of 
political conflicts that escalate about the power and imagined political community. Iraq since 
2003 is the most striking example.  
These countries also experience major reforms in terms of “political rights” and “right to 
politics”: this distinction is suggested by J. Heurtaux (2005) concerning the Polish case. After 
1989, what he calls the “partisanization”21 process is played notably in struggles on the 
codification of political competition since 1989, the strong “jurisdiction of political activity” but 
also the strong “politicization of law”. The fields of our research have indeed known in the past 
decade a transformation of the laws governing ruling political activities (electoral laws, laws on 
political parties, freedom of the press, public and associative liberties, etc.).They inaugurate a kind 
of “political pluralism”, at least from a procedural viewpoint. The substantial character of this 
pluralism, however, is challenged by each of the chapters that follow. If Lebanese 
parliamentarians have not adopted a new law on political parties, the drafters of the constitutional 
reform passed in the Taef (1990) reaffirmed the liberal orientation of the existing law. In the 
other cases, the latest legislation liberalize the space of partisan action, but keep it tightly situated 
by the control, if not arbitrariness, of the central government. This accompanies the remarkable 
growth in the number of recognized political parties that we have already noted.  
The Algerian case, with the constitutional opening to a multiparty after nearly 30 years of single 
party system and the interruption of the electoral process in 1991, is the most striking to analyze 
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the waltz-hesitations of these reforms. The transition to multiparty in favor of reform “from 
above” and mobilizations “from below” seems like a very fragile prelude to democratization. In 
regard to “false pretenses” of multiparty-system, some stress, as in Morocco, that “all in all, 
power remains concentrated and held by the same forces since independence, across institutions 
that crown or mediate their political preponderance.” (Santucci, 2006a, p. 162). But we can also 
show the emergence of new political forces in recent decades, with the help of legal and political 
reforms that “open” the partisan scene: The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, the 
Islamic Front of Salute in Algeria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, al-Islah in Yemen, the Sadrist 
Movement or Hizb al-Fadila al-Islami in Iraq, etc. 
 
The influence of external factors: a domino effect?  
Obviously, short histories that the partisan scenes of the region face are intimately linked to 
transnational processes and especially to the neo-liberal agenda.  
Engaged for several years or even decades for some in a process of economic liberalization 
accompanied by a discourse on democratization (or at least on the need to comply with a number 
of procedural criteria), regimes renegotiate their inclusion in the market economy. These socio-
economic changes are not without effect on partisan configurations that take charge, in a 
pluralistic and more or less reactive manner, of social demands and unprecedented cleavage 
brought about by these reforms (El-Salahi* and El-Maitama, 2008). This raises two questions at 
least: Why do socialist parties have difficulties advocating for social claims which are born in the 
trenches of neo-liberalism? Has the development of Islamist parties been fed, in part at least, with 
a new form of populism favored by the social effects of these quick economic reforms? 
Remarkably, and despite the impending question of economic issue in each of the countries 
studied, the economic agenda (and controversies that might arise) is virtually absent from most 
political parties programs.  
Let us note also that the Arab regimes on which we focus show certain autonomy in coping with 
what would be an international agenda of democratization; even more in the process of 
“partisanization”. In their collective work on political parties in conflict prone societies, edited by 
the ONU press, B. Reilly and P. Nordlund (2008) do not include any Arab parties, as if these 
were excluded from this collective reflection on the role that the partisan scene could play in the 
process of democratization, mediating interests, and regulation of conflicts. Finally, programs of 
international assistance to Arab political parties are only recent and very modest in relation to 
assistance given to civil society, whereas even elsewhere, “spurred by the liberalization of 
previous Autocratic states in African, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, the international 
community began to invest heavily in concepts of democratic promotion, electoral support and 
'good governance' as essential elements of economic development and the creation of stable and 
peaceful states “(ibid., p. 5). 
In sum, regarding the short history of these last fifteen years, the evolution of partisan dynamics 
in the six countries discussed in this volume show some remarkable common characteristics: 
their number increases significantly. They are subject to new formal game rules. Their ideologies 
seem to lessen at the benefit of political strategies, including partisan formations who claim a 
distinctive ideological identity, notably Islamists. They maintain close interdependent relations 
with regimes and central administrations, thought co-optation, prohibition, infiltration or 
distancing. The interpretation of the law, the exercise of the arbitrary and procedures for 
financing political parties, largely dependent on public resources (except in the case of Lebanon 
or Iraq) put the political parties under “conditional liberty”, under the constant threat of 
sanctions or even prohibition22. Finally, in contrast with the figure of the professional militant of 
the 1960/1970‟s, the relation to parties seems precarious: forms of activism are often flexible, 
fluid, and prone to many “infidelities.” This is measured as much at the level of the militant 
base23 as at the level of political leaders themselves who can change hats depending on the 
circumstances or create new parties when their partisan formation seems ineffective in managing 
their individual careers. What follows is a blurring of labels that confuses even the militant base 
and reduces opportunities for recruitment. In addition, the political parties generally seem not to 
be key stakeholders in political decision, neither in policy making, especially because of the 
weakness and marginalization of parliamentary institutions. Their relationship with the “civil 
society” or at least with a vast network of associations, is finally renegotiated: Far from a binary 
or Manichean scheme between a vulnerable partisan society, and an alive and active civil society, 
analysis of the partisan phenomenon in our field shows, if proof were needed, to which point the 
spheres of the partisan and civil are entangled in each other  Sometimes associations were refuge 
institutions when the partisan life was prohibited (eg. the association al-islamiyah al-taw'yya was a 
façade for the Islamist party al-dawa in Bahrain during the period in which political associations 
were prohibited from any activity)24. Other times, the association serves as the right-hand of the 
party to organize social activities, to guide and train its youth25, to reach certain target 
populations, at the local level26, in universities, etc. In other cases, associative and partisan 
structures compete: thus, it is often the associations of human rights or civil liberties that fight 
for political causes and right to politics such as the holding of elections, the reform of political 
laws, etc. It is noteworthy that in our field, other forms of mobilization organize political 
societies: communitarian groups, families, tribes, etc. can be the cements of partisan 
organizations that carry their “primordial” interests. The latter can undermine partisan 
mobilizations which transgress their social organization, in the name of classist or transverse 
watchwords. 
 
The singular effects of the long history  
 
Beyond these common features, the singularities of partisan trajectories in all six countries can be 
explained in large part by the specifics of the history of formation of their States. Three entries 
allow us to discuss this: 
First, the local history of the concept of political party is sometimes very recent and poorly 
consolidated and other times, installed and tested. Sometimes the object “political party” is clearly 
distinguished from other forms of political organizations. Other times it is confused with other 
types of mobilization.  
Next, the history of the major political movements is closely interwoven with that of the 
formation of Nation States. In Morocco or in Algeria, the parties led the national liberation, while 
in other cases, they occupied a secondary role behind personalities or political and community 
leaders. The national struggle, the decolonization, and the national construction gave rise to 
                                               
22 For example : the Lebanese Forces party in Lebanon in 1994, The Islamic Front of Salute, FIS, in Algeria in 
1991, the Bahraini Center for Human Rights in 2004, etc. 
23 With notable exceptions: for example the militant base of Hezbollah in Lebanon has shown for two decades, 
and in different situations (elections, mobilizations, etc.), a solid allegiance to the party and to its leader. 
24 For a table tracing the link between associations and political parties in Bahrain see: El-Khawaja* and El-
Murshed (2008). 
25 See the contribution of C. Le Thomas to this volume. 
26 See the contribution of M. Catusse and L. Zaki to this volume. 
different political and partisan situations. In Yemen (before unification) and in Iraq, the single 
party or the quasi-single party (with a partisan coalition as façade) developed. In Algeria, the 
single-party became a “Party-State.” And in Bahrain, partisan life has been banned. In other 
countries on the contrary, the multiparty system characterized from the outset the formation of a 
consociation system in the case of Lebanon or a limited and feckless pluralism in the case of 
Morocco, ruled by the royal institution. Thus, reading of the long history shows us profoundly 
different experiences between the parties with ideological or parliamentary and governmental 
heritage, and others that are recent creations and learn the basics of the sharing of power. The 
clandestine action is as well a discriminatory experience and has influenced the trajectory of many 
partisan formations.  
Finally, the ideological history - particularly the ideology of regimes that are developing - 
highlights the effects of socialist, nationalist and / or revolutionary legacies: particularly in terms 
of legitimization or de-legitimization of partisan plurality.  
 
NEW POLITICAL OBJECTS, GLOBALIZED AND SINGULAR?  
 
If the developments that came before call for a re-conceptualization of the analysis of political 
parties in the Arab world, it seems equally important to us to reexamine their types, or even to 
discuss new evidence for their understanding and classification.  
Different kinds of “Arab parties” were produced. B. Badie (1989) distinguished in the “Muslim” 
world “the single parties” like the Algerian FLN; political parties defining themselves through the 
“outlines of a political ideology”, such as the Baath; the parties that are used as a place of 
“promoting the legitimacy of a leader”, like the Tunisian Neo-Destour; parties that are 
constituents of the regimes they support, especially in the “traditional monarchies”; the “pressure 
parties” that ensure the same constituent function but in a latent manner, as in the case of the 
Egyptian Wafd, and the Morrocan UNFP; and finally the parties perceive their action from a 
“counter legitimacy” and advocate the construction of another political system. We realize how 
much now this typology is not operative. 
Still among the French authors, P. R. Baduel (1998) then attempted to adopt the analysis of S. 
Lipset and S. Rokkan (1967) to the Arab parties, to classify parties around the cleavages “religion 
/ secularism”, “center / periphery”, “owners / workers”, “State / civil society.” Here again the 
criteria are questionable. Camau and Mr. V. Geisser show for example that the four cleavages of 
S. Lipset and S. Rokkan are difficult to extend to describe the Tunisian partisan scene, and their 
findings can be extended to countries in our study. These divides are present in these societies, 
but political organizations obey logics far more deciding: “it is from an ongoing strategy of 
euphemism of social cleavages that they intend to draw their partisan legitimacy and not from 
their exacerbation. They thus contribute to increase the externality of the political order in 
relation to societal issues “(Camau and Geisser, 2003, p. 248).  
We may also, like F. El-Khazen (2003, p. 613) in the case of Lebanon in the 1990s, distinguish 
the “loyalists”, “authorized” or “forbidden” parties. The first are represented in the parliament 
and government since 1992, the second have no representation in political power, and the 
banned parties are systematically tracked, directly or indirectly by government authorities. But 
given the evolution of the pluralization of partisan scenes, this classification does not reflect 
contemporary dynamics where the blurring of boundaries between ruling parties and opposition 
parties in particular is becoming more obvious: either because of government alternating (for 
example the 1998 “Alternance” in Morocco); or because the notion of opposition itself may refer 
to various political strategies, including in the same context, where the opposition can be built 
against the regime or with the coalition of governing parties (the case of Lebanon and the after-
war is striking from this point of view).  
Several of the authors of our book have chosen to adopt other classifications. In Yemen, the 
parties are classified as “clan” ('acha'erî), “tribal” (qaba'ilî), “confessional” (mazhab) “traditional” 
(taqlidi) or “modern” (hadith) (El-Salahi and El -Maitama, 2008); in Iraq, they are sorted according 
to their leadership “religious” (dini), “traditional” (taqlidi), “clan” ('acha'erî) or “nontraditional” 
(gheyr taqlîdiyya) which intersect with modes of bureaucratic organization, 
charismatic/personalized, military, Leninist or elitist. These classifications useful to describe the 
partisan landscape, may however have the disadvantage of the freezing it into rigid categories, not 
helpful to explain how today partisan organizations are reshaping. 
It seems finally that two processes deserve attention as to actual links between the contemporary 
partisan dynamics and Regime changes: the logics of de-politicization or re-politicization of the 
debate and of public action; the effects of generations on activism  
 
Politicization and de-politicization of partisan scenes 
 
The transformation of political scenes in the six countries of our study confronts the problems of 
politicization / de-politicization / over-politicization not sparing the partisan scene. The 
promotion of “good governance” and “new public management” and the Regimes changes, 
largely calls for expertise, technocracy and business discourse and tools, at least in a formal 
manner. Political correctness is increasingly defined through the criteria of “good management” 
Meanwhile, the anti-partisan discourse get settled, the issue of political representation is relegated 
to subordinate priorities, the municipal and parliamentary arenas are often pushed around 
(Baaklini, Denoeux and Springborg, 1999; Dupret and Ferrié, 2008 ; Salem*, Krayem and 
Antoun, 1998, LCPS, 1999, 2002a). In this logic of anti-politics, associations develop “above” 
parties (Zaki 2009), or for “lack” of party (Karam, 2006). In return, others pretend to “discover” 
the degree of politicization of institutions and actors, associates, technocrats, experts, etc. By 
emphasizing their share of parliamentary action or of local commitment for example, militants of 
Islamist parties particularly invest these tribunes and provide them again with political stakes.  
This raises two questions: in which extent does the transition from old to new regime affect the 
potential of political parties, that is to say, their ability to enroll in power games, to produce 
collective identities, to play the mediator in public space? And how does militancy change in their 
midst?  
 
The old and the new regime  
In the framework of this inventory of partisan dynamics in six Arab regimes, our different 
contributions are based implicitly or explicitly, on a historical perspective that distinguishes a 
“before” and an “after”, an “old regime” and a “new regime”, which would result in or reflect the 
emergence of “new parties”. This merits deeper examination. As we have emphasized regarding 
the different historicities of partisan processes, strong continuity and resilience combine with 
elements of disruption and innovation. Regarding the internal dynamics of parties and their 
inclusion in the political field, this can be broken down into several areas:  
The transition from being clandestine to legality first, affects relations between partisan 
organizations and those of civil society, which could play turn by turn the role of refuge in times 
of prohibition or that find themselves in competitive or subordinate position. The legalization 
and new laws, while ensuring the pluralization of the game may be a test for political parties 
previously banned or simply tolerated, since it required from their leaders and militants a revision 
of strategies, of discourse, modes of mobilization, directories of action, and even the constitution 
of effective political resources. 
The transition from opposition to government has also produced complex opportunities and 
constraints for the competing parties. The movement from radical and exclusivist positions 
(which can go to the point of denying the legitimacy of the other, be it the opponent or the ruler) 
to the formalization of political pact, based on the rejection of violence and the formalization of a 
compromise on the minimal rules of the game, resulted in the participation of virtually the 
majority of political parties in the most recent elections, even to their participation in 
government. Again, this is a test for parties, expensive for some, and not only those that were in 
power: Equally those that passed from “historic” opposition to the government renounced to 
former repertoires of action and modes of legitimization which up until then were paramount. 
This applies to the Moroccan USFP, whose members, leaders, activists and voters find 
themselves faced with resources, position and legitimacy noticeably opposed to those that were 
theirs for over three decades. In the case of Yemen, too, al-islah finds itself divided between a 
tendency toward emancipation vis-à-vis the regime under whose tutelage it could become 
institutionalized and developed; and its position of opponent in the context of a multiparty 
system but certainly not pluralistic.  
 
The End of Ideologies?  
Another recurring issue is that of the mutation or even the erosion of ideologies. In reality, the 
decline of nationalist and class ideologies seems at first to be compensated by the excitement of 
discourses on primordial identity. The partisan organization becomes the site for advocacy and 
representation of Muslim identities, Sunni or Shiite, in the case of development of parties called 
“Islamists”, but also communitarian or ethnic (Krayem* et al, 2007).  
The decline of class identity, also matches the constant displacement of the line of cleavage 
between secular and religious movements. The crisis of the social State and the shrinking of the 
capacity of direct redistribution schemes of regimes that are turning to private companies or 
associations to discharge themselves for social issues help the return of notables, at local and 
national level. We observe it particularly in the entry into politics of businessmen, traders or 
employers who invest labor and corporatist unions, but also municipal councils, parliaments and 
political parties (Catusse, 2008)27. Even if new ideologies and identities of groups may thus be 
drawn, the main trend identified in our field is that of the “decline of ideology” in favor of 
strategic politics: the ideological characteristics of parties become blurred because of strategies 
and political arguments (to participate or not in government, to build coalitions, etc.). This is 
reflected by the resemblance and weak consistency of political platforms of parties, including 
election time. Should we, on this point, put forward the secular parties against Islamist parties, 
while making the hypothesis that weakness of the former is tied to their difficulty to develop a 
clear vision? M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawy (2007, p. 18) emphasize that “Political parties 
competing in elections do not always have to have a vision, but they need at least a message 
about what they will do if they win the elections.” In our field, the Islamist message is also too 
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vague and eventually little ideologized. But it tends to «coupled the religion appeal with social 
services for their constituencies, never taking them for granted” (idem.).  
These vacillations in the programs are accompanied by clientelisation of militants: it would be less 
ideology than the provision of services that would make supporters loyal. This is what the elected 
PJD of our research in Morocco expressed, who euphemize to the maximum their relationship to 
Islam and the Islamic content of their program at the profit of a discourse on their willing to help 
their electors and the citizens of their circumscription. This is also what L. Bonnefoy and M. 
Poirier show in Yemen where the plasticity of the doctrinal and programmatic structure of al-Islah 
and the eclecticism of its surroundings - both Islamist, commercial and tribal - are tools to favor 
the relations to the clients, but also partisan “nomadism”. In Algeria, A. Boubaker (2008) also 
stresses that the development of the Salafi movement, in the context of ad-da'wa as-salafiyya, 
responds in a way to neutralization of political charge of Islamist parties, either that they be 
banned or that they be radicalized and equipped with weapons, or that they erase their ideology 
in exchange for positions of power in the case of Hamas or en-Nahda.  
 
What partisan militancy? 
We would like to conclude this passage on contemporary partisan dynamics with some remarks 
about militancy. As noted above, if the work on collective action has very appreciably developed 
over the past decade in the region (Bennani-Chraibi, Fillieul, 2003; Karam, 2006; Favier, 2004, 
Vairel, 2005, etc.) with original and innovative theories, virtually none is on the contemporary 
partisan militancy. If is important to open up the study of militant careers, would that not be 
because they navigate from parties to syndicates, passing by associations and other places of 
engagement, it also seems to us that the partisan militancy itself deserves attention. Because of 
that, the study of militant trajectories would include a blind but central angle. We content 
ourselves by pointing out to several lines of analysis.  
First, the arena of mobilizations is reshaping, as we have repeatedly emphasized. If the nostalgia 
of the “second era liberal” (Salamé, 1991, 1994) reaches here and there, lamenting that militancy 
is not what it was, others show instead how the expertise and the militant experience move and 
transpose from generation to generation in different partisan structures. So could it be 
conversions of leftist militancy: if some are disengaging, others are investing in new partisan 
arenas (sometimes Islamists (Burgat, 2007) or associative (Bennani-Chraibi, 2003). The 
investigation of frame analysis but also circles and networks of engagement can deepen a 
knowledge that is still poor and not well documented. It would include data to confirm or refute 
the thesis according to which the actual political and electoral resources of most Islamist parties 
would reside in the character otherwise exceptional or at least innovative of its militancy: the 
available works stress, as opposed to other political groups, on the discipline, the expertise and 
dedication that Hizbollah militants in Lebanon or, to a lesser degree, PJD Militants in Morocco 
would show (Fawwaz, 2004; Harb, 2005; Chaib, 2008)28. On the field, the gaps between the 
partisan ideology, even though it may be vague, the slogans of the party, and militants often 
proves very striking, which questions the ability of parties to provide a framing for their militants. 
Next, the militant partisan trajectories can not be understand without regarding the 
transformations of arenas of mobilization, notably the development of social movements or at 
least the vast network of associations. Far from observing a civil society against a partisan society, 
or on the contrary a civil society at the service of a partisan society, we find at least four moving 
configurations: first, in Lebanon, in the civil movements (Karam, 2006), and in Morocco also 
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(Vairel, 2005), the party structures are circumvented at the profile of apparently alternative 
arenas. Militants engage or reconvert their militancy in associative structures in search of 
something better: for want of finding, they say, political parties capable of carrying their causes 
and claims. In these cases the associations are potentially competitors of political parties, as their 
anti-chamber. Analysts of professional syndicates also show that they can serve as places of 
reliance for defending interests, when the passage to partisan life is blocked or turns out to be too 
expensive (Gobe, 2006; Bianchi, 1989). Secondly, associations develop in the service of political 
party, as these “social institutions” in the words of C. Le Thomas in this book on the subject of 
the schools “of” Hizbollah. Places of mobilization and socialization, they are also places of 
distribution of social services, creators of loyalty or at least familiarity, as L. Bonnefoy and M. 
Poirier show about the charity association al-Islah (jam'iyya lil-Islah al-Ijtima'i al-khayriyya), which 
although officially independent of the party nevertheless contributes to disseminate the ideas of 
the latter and insure part of its popularity. In a third case, the associative and partisan structures 
are neither competing nor directly intertwined: they are simply different structures in the course 
of militancy which often combines the locations and causes of engagement (this may be the case 
now of a number of associations for human rights that welcome in their ranks against the abuse 
of rights of regimes, militants of Left parties, secularist militants or even militants from Islamist 
parties, or for the most not affiliated to any party). Finally, in the fourth possible configuration as 
in Bahrain, but also in the emblematic case of the association al-adl wa al-ihsan in Morocco, the 
associative space serves as a substitution space for potential political parties, however formally 
excluded from electoral competition and political representation.  
Finally, if we have stressed earlier that militancy would professionalize and would assume the 
contours of management, the effects of generation in the militant structures remained to be 
explored: a number of studies show that the partisan framework is aging, sometimes even issued 
from the first generation. They also show, as in the case of Bahrain, that divisions emerge in or 
around the political groups, in terms of generational renewal. It would also be particularly useful 
to continue work on the many faces that engagement takes around the parties: cadres, elected 
representatives, professionals, militants, combatants, voters, brokers (muftah Intikhabi), 





This work therefore calls for release the object “political party” from the purgatory of research in 
the region. The following chapters reflect the joints between the variable links between the 
partisan evolution and the transformation of regimes in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen 
and Bahrain. Based on unpublished data and a field approach, they discuss many facets of 
partisan life in political societies characterized by their limited and feckless pluralism and having a 
reputation alternately of being authoritarian or in democratic transition.  
The chapters of F. Abdul-Jabbar on the Iraqi Communist Party, of H. I'buchi on the re-
conversion of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and L. Bonnefoy and M. Poirier on the 
difficult construction of a alternative project from the Yemeni Gathering for Reform, interested 
primarily with the effects of mutations of the partisan game; on the consequences of the 
transition from underground to legality, opposition to participation. They pay attention to 
institutional and legal frameworks in which partisan activity takes place and to the links between 
“the right to politics and political rights”.  
The following chapters look into the life of the parties, the renewal of the elites and their modes 
of selection, on the favored forms of militancy, on the internal party conflicts and on the variety 
of their activities, notably social. Thus, in Morocco, Mr. Bennani-Chraibi examines the 
parliamentary “notabilization” of a “party of militants”, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, 
and M. Catusse and L. Zaki study the transformation of profiles and practices of the local 
representatives of the Justice and development party. A. Mirza El-Murshed outlines the internal 
dynamics at the Islamic Association al-wifaq al-watani in Bahrain, paying particular attention to the 
effects of generation within this association seeking partisan systems. Finally, C. Le Thomas looks 
at the process of political socialization at work in schools in the Hezbollah movement in 
Lebanon.  
Finally, the last chapters, those of Mr. Hennadi on the Algerian FLN and that of R. Tal‟at Jawhar 
on the Turkmen Front in Iraq, bring to light a recurring question on our field: that of the 
production of identities and political allegiances varying within the Nation State. The paradigm of 
a single party has, in the name of defending the integrity of the nation state, undoubtedly 
influenced the ordering of authoritarian and hegemonic regimes in the region. But the 
development of ethnic parties, community, and confessional, infra or supra State is also one of 
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